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People conceive and create goods, which they then distribute among themselves. Her, the conception 
and creation precede and control the distribution. Goods don’t just appear in the hands of distributive 
agents who do with them as they like or give them out in accordance with some general principle. 
Rather, goods with their meaning – because of their meanings – are the crucial medium of social relations; 
they come into people’s minds before they come into their hands; distributions are patterned in 
accordance with shared conceptions of what the goods are and what they are for. Distributive agents are 
constrained by the goods they hold; one might almost say that goods distribute themselves among 
peoples. (Michael Walzer 1983:6ff.)
‘Health’ as a ‘political issue’
Medical ethics have the tendency to isolate moral conflicts from their social contexts. For this 
reason, questions of justice play only a minor role there. From the tradition of the medical ethics, 
mainly the principles of ‘nonmaleficence’ and ‘beneficence’ are known to us. These principles 
originate from a time in which, due to the lack of effective therapeutic abilities of action, the 
medical practice had the main task to prevent evil from the patient. Since the 1960s, it was ‘patience 
autonomy’ that became increasingly important. There will be a detailed reference to it in the 
course of this article. However justice in medical affairs has never got and enjoyed the prominence, 
which in particular the latter, viz. the patience autonomy, could achieve. Those questions of 
justice, which are of immediate and direct relevance, will be illustrated by the European examples 
of Greece and Spain. Those who neglect questions of justice have no sight for the grave health 
relevant consequences of an austerity policy as it was and still is practiced in succession of the 
great financial crisis in many countries to consolidate their national budgets.
In Greek medical centres, emergency ambulances have been closed for several days a week since 
2012 because of money shortage. These ambulances treated patients free of charge and thus had 
to cope with waves of unemployed and no longer medically insured people. According to different 
shocking reports in German newspapers of January 2012, the ambulance of the Papageorgiou-
Hospital in Thessaloniki had to treat up to 1500 patients per day. Now, just as a comparison: The 
ambulance of the largest medical centre in Europe, the Charité in Berlin, gets 580 patients done 
per day – at most! In the emergency ambulance Rechts-der-Isar in Munich about 70 people are 
looked after per day. In Greece, security agencies protected doctors against desperate patients and 
patients against other patients. Before operations people were sometimes asked to buy the needed 
threads themselves at the chemists, because the hospital was no longer provided with the needed 
basic utensils. Even cancer medicaments had to be financed in advance by the patients for the 
time being. As many were unable to do so, they died ahead of time. Repeatedly, the sentence is 
heard from the medical personnel: ‘It is like a war’. German media reported that, at that time in 
Spain, 21 emergency ambulances had to be closed in rural areas because of economy measures. 
The nearest hospital for the population of such areas was about 150 km away. The consequences 
In the last quarter of the 20th century medical ethics underwent a kind of renaissance: 
developments in biotechnology, in pharmacy, but, overall, increased possibilities in lifestyles 
and life-extension due to advanced technological approaches captured our attention and led 
to a rehabilitation of ethics in general and medical ethics in particular. Initially these ethics 
operated with relatively simple principles. These principles, as they have been formulated by 
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress (1994), sound like a mantra to our ears: ‘Autonomy’, 
‘Nonmaleficence’, ‘Beneficence’, and ‘Justice’. Compared to the other three, the last named 
principle, ‘Justice’, has led and, until the present day, continues to lead a shadowy existence. 
The question of what ‘just healthcare’ means, and especially what ‘just health’ is, is hardly ever 
raised. In addition to this, the social characteristics of ‘health’ have been forgotten in a 
reprehensible way. A future medical ethics must deal with two key challenges. First, what is 
the good of health and how is it constituted? Second, what can ‘just health’ mean if we view it 
against the background of the social causes of health and disease.
Autonomy and Just Health
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of these measures need no comments. David Stuckler and 
Sanjay Basu (2013) have very impressively described the 
disastrous consequences of those budgetary refurbishments 
in their book The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills. And 
indeed, it is nothing less than the question of ‘Politics of Life 
and Death’. Questions of justice in the sphere of health care 
always and inevitably have to do with a ‘Distribution of Life 
and Death’. Health is in any case a politicum [political issue].
Solidarity as a virtue and 
institutional ‘form of control’
What has happened? Meanwhile we lack a feeling ‘what we 
owe each other’ (Scanlon 1999). This phrasing implies no 
highly moral appeal immediately addressed to the individual 
conscience. There is no doubt that the individual feeling and 
the personal conviction we owe each other, is still in existence. 
In accordance with Friedhelm Hengsbach (2012) this attitude 
could be called the ‘virtue of solidarity’. What, however, has 
undoubtedly got lost, is the control form cast in institutions. 
Here we are dealing with basic goods, with public or social 
goods.
During the last four decades, an extensive erosion of basic 
goods has happened, which means that former basic goods, 
respectively public goods such as health (and education), 
have been transferred into private responsibility and 
increasingly into the laws of the market. Public goods have 
turned into private goods. This does not only mean that the 
privatisation of former social state institutions have 
proliferated (and still do), but it also means that particular 
goods are subject to the laws of competition, which probably 
are only partly applicable to these goods.
Competition is directed towards products and services, but 
what about health and education products or patients and 
student customers who expect services? The formerly quoted 
sentence of Thomas Scanlon (1999), ‘what we owe each 
other’, refers to those areas in which human beings do not 
meet at eye level although they see each other as equals. The 
willingness, to see human beings as equals, although they are not 
meeting at eye level is called solidarity. The latter is a form of 
asymmetrical reciprocity in which, figuratively spoken, there 
is a side that gives and a receiving hand. Here, at least, the 
logic of giving dominates and not ‘in general’ the logic of 
competition and the logic of the market. Risks of life, which 
practically cannot be burdened on the individual’s shoulders, 
are here mastered by the community.
This solidarity reaches beyond virtuous acting in unity. It 
is also this behaviour, the ‘virtue of solidarity’, that gets 
under severe pressure as soon as supporting institutions or 
control forms are reduced. Here the socio-economic, well-
documented cognition is valid so that justified action is 
dependent on just institutions. Without the institutional 
‘form of control’ of solidarity, the virtue of solidarity erodes 
at any time. Moreover, in the environment of the debates 
about solidarity, the perspective of the strong ones who 
repeatedly refer to the too great strain of the giving ones and 
who understand the situation of the weak ones as the 
consequence of their own failure has prevailed:
The commonly felt basis of an elementary bond is faded out in 
the same way like the knowledge of experience that [particular] 
… risks cannot be ascribed individually. That from the feeling 
and the cognition of unequal distribution of risks the insight of 
an asymmetrical mutuality follows, is willingly superseded. 
(Hengsbach 2012:189)
But perhaps medical ethics is not completely innocent of this 
development. To my mind, this has to do with the one-sided 
emphasis of the ‘autonomy’ in its discourses.
Problems with the autonomy
Patient autonomy has become very beloved and dear to us. 
For at least four decades it has been the centre of medical 
ethical debates and is evaluated as an important formula of 
emancipation. During the same time, however, the concept of 
patient autonomy has undergone a dynamics from which a 
problem has to be made.
The patient has become a mature and responsible person 
who has managed to liberate her- or himself – from case to 
case or both at a time, from the guardianship of a medical 
profession tending towards paternalism as well as from her 
or his passive role within society and politics. The two 
famous US-American moral philosophers in the field of 
medical ethics, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F.Childresss 
(1994) had distinguished between four ethical principles in 
their academic bestseller Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
which are fundamental for the public health system: 
‘Respect for Autonomy’, ‘Nonmaleficence’, ‘Beneficence’, 
and ‘Justice’. The second and third principles have ever 
since been part of the moral canon of medical behaviour and 
acting. The fourth principle, ‘Justice’, could not come up 
with such a career. It remained, as they say, the wallflower of 
medical ethics and with it the idea of solidarity had become 
marginal for a long time. Questions of justice and solidarity, 
such as how to distribute resources fairly and how to limit 
medical interventions if necessary, had become second-rate. 
Why? Because the answers that had to be given were 
irksome.
Autonomy: An indispensable right 
and ideal
Probably we should distinguish between two things first: the 
patient and his or her autonomy. Thus, the first question is: 
What is a patient? According to the Latin origin a patient is a 
‘suffering human being’. He or she has not chosen his or her 
disease voluntarily and in the individual case it leads to a 
grave restriction of the active living conditions. For often, she 
or he is a sufferer, a quarreller, someone who has become 
passive in comparison with what she or he was able to do as 
a healthy person. Patients long for attention and depend on 
our care. For the duration of their disease or illness they have 
changed sides. It can undoubtedly be assumed as correct that 
turning towards them, having an open eye and talking to 
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them, means an essential contribution to their recovery. We 
know that confidence can cure.
‘What does autonomy mean?’, sounds the second question. 
With regard to its subject, viz. the patient, one can point out 
two features: the autonomy of decision-making and the 
autonomy as a right. We speak about the autonomy of 
decision-making as soon as a patient has to agree to a plan of 
medical treatment. Such a decision is called an ‘informed 
approval’, as is known. The patient has been informed about 
and agreed to the course and the risks of a treatment. He or 
she has decided for him- or herself. The right on autonomy, 
however, means that persons have the possibility to claim 
this right to decide for themselves. Their determination on 
how to treat them medically cannot be evaded or neglected. 
Or, expressed in a more technical way, autonomy means the 
negative right, respectively the defensive right of the patient 
that action or operation by others must be omitted unless an 
approval has been given. The right on autonomy thus 
corresponds with the duty of omitting on the side of the 
treating authority. This autonomy of the patient is a normative 
principle which, to my mind, is indispensable. Its validity 
must never be called in question. A distinction, however, 
must be made between this principle or right and the definite 
and often limited abilities of a human being to practice 
autonomy. However, in which do the previously mentioned 
dynamics of a patient’s autonomy exist?
On the way to expecting too much
This problem can best be understood by briefly reconstructing 
the changes of patient autonomy. Since the 1960s everyone has 
been talking about this phrase. Historically seen the 
Nuremberg Codex (1947) was its hour of birth. In case of 
medical experiment, so it says under point one of this codex, 
the voluntary and informed agreement of the patient or test 
person must be obtained. This right on autonomy, passed by 
the World Medical Association in 1964, was adopted into the 
Declaration of Helsinki. Only in modern medical ethics, as it 
came into existence in the USA at the beginning of the 1960s, 
that principle of agreement in the non-experimental medical 
practice was implemented. This kind of patient autonomy 
has been an ethical standard since and its validity is rightfully 
indisputable. Since the implementation of this ‘informed 
agreement’, the knowledge of patients, male or female, has 
become more and more enlarged. Autonomy here means 
self-determination: enlightenment and approval with the 
help of information.
The next step leads us to the responsible and mature patient. 
This type of patient knows his or her interests, is seen as a 
partner in the course of the treatment process and is capable 
of thinking about the means, the aim and the sense of a 
treatment. Here patient and doctor ought to communicate on 
eye level in the sense of ‘Shared-Decision-Making’. The 
question, however, is in how far this model considers the 
unequal positions and the differentials of competence 
between the two sides. Autonomy here means maturity and 
responsibility through communication.
The third step leads us to the self-improving patient, whose 
level of demand has enormously changed. It is not the 
treatment of a disease or illness that becomes the focus of 
attention, but the improvement of health. This demands a 
strategy in which, increasingly, specific age restrictions are 
potentially seen as diseases, as in need and capable of 
improvement. Here autonomy means self-perfection through 
optimising intervention.
The fourth and last step is directly connected with the 
preceding one: now the patient is discovered as someone 
who participates in the market. He or she is to behave as a 
customer on the health market. Strategic and rational 
competence is required. Even as patients, the motives of the 
homo oeconomicus should not go astray. Health becomes a 
good which is worth competing for. Autonomy here means 
rationalisation through calculation.
This sketch deliberately accepts a certain simplification. The 
intimated development as a whole is in no way to be judged 
negative. But it is one-sided. In it the most important 
perspective is about to get lost. It is the one that sees the 
patient as a dependent, suffering human being who is in 
need of the care of others. And with him even solidarity 
threatens to disappear. The question of justice is forgotten. 
That is meant by a ‘trap’ of autonomy. This could lead to 
patients who expect too much from themselves and it could 
lead to their isolation. The autonomous patient would then 
be a lonely and neglected human being. Dealing with patients 
and also their self-image is characterised by a culture of 
liberty rights. At the same time the importance of self-
determination in some situations is increasingly mixed up 
with the demand of wanting and being able to decide and 
longing for everything.
We are increasingly losing the sense for our finiteness and the 
necessary extend of solidarity. The one-sided orientation of 
vast parts of medical ethics on ‘autonomy’ has let the level of 
demand run riot. In not just a few patients or potential 
patients’ minds it has developed into a license of wanting –
often to their own disadvantage.
The outlined development is part of an overall social drive 
and therefore cannot be examined in isolation. Meanwhile 
we have become citizens of a ‘Project-Polis’ (Luc Boltanski & 
Éve Chiapello 2007) in which we increasingly understand 
ourselves as entrepreneurs of our own behalf. Our 
‘entrepreneurial ego’ (Bröckling 2007) forces us to become 
flexible project-planners of our lives. Autonomy has then 
become an obligation, which does not call a halt to any 
spheres of life. At the latest we must now deal with the status 
of the good of health.
The good of health: Three theses
In the following I roughly try to cover these ‘specific conditions 
of the good of health’. The focus will be on three aspects: 
Firstly the construction of the good ‘health’ has to be grasped. 
The answer is that this good is created by our interpretations. 
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It depends on our interpretations and it is neither a matter 
of course nor a naturally given fact. But where are the limits 
of interpretation? Can we shift the limits just as we like? 
Therefore, in the second place, the range of interpretation has 
to be limited through a description of the phenomenon health. 
Thus, I support the thesis that we should understand health 
from the perspective of disease respectively to that of the 
patient if we do not want to run the risk of missing important 
points of view. Thirdly, as a factual consequence of the two 
mentioned reflections, the question has to be asked, viz. what 
status ‘health’ has in the system of goods. Hence, the question 
has to be answered whether ‘health’ is a private or a public 
good.
To start with, we must clarify what a good is. A good is a 
circumstance which we appreciate. This easy phrasing makes it 
instantly clear that an abundance of goods exist. This 
abundance corresponds with the presumably immense 
amount of things that human beings appreciate. A good is 
always important for me, which means for the particular 
person, and we are many. However, it is uncertain that what 
is important for me, is also of real importance beyond my 
interests. Therefore, we must turn our intention to the various 
kinds of goods and particularly ask the question whether all 
goods are apt for the market. One can distinguish between 
four kinds of goods: the ‘existential’ the ‘private’, the ‘public’ 
and the ‘common’ goods.
Existential goods are ones that are of fundamental quality for 
the life of every human being and whose partial or total 
absence means an immediate restriction in a person’s life. It 
is clear that health is such an existential good. Private goods 
are ones whose high esteem is optional to us. ‘Optional’ here 
has two meanings: their high esteem is up to us. We are free 
to strive after them or not and they do not have any 
consequence in form of an obligation for others. The choice 
between Mozart and Madonna is up to me. Whether classic 
or pop is a good for me, depends on my arbitrariness. The 
situation, however, is completely different with public goods.
In the Roman Law the category of the res extra commercium 
existed. It referred to things which could not pass into private 
possession and with which no trading was therefore allowed. 
The so-called extra commerciality was related to ‘holy’ objects 
(res divini iuris), ‘public legitimate’ objects (res publicae), and 
the res communes omnium, namely the common goods of all 
people (like for example air and water). The latter goods we 
would call ‘common goods’. To these ‘commons’, the US-
American Nobel Prize winner for economics, Elionor Ostrom 
(1990; 2012), dedicated her scientific life. The res publicae are 
called ‘public goods’ today.
The division of goods into existential, private, public and 
common goods is not independent from our decisions and 
our interpretations. These different categorical goods do not 
grow on trees neither are they of natural origin. It is us who 
decide with our interpretations what we subsume under 
these particular categories. If we want to do so politically, we 
could declare water as a private good, which is not extra-
commercial. It cannot be excluded that, in future, even air 
will achieve such a commercial status. What we traditionally 
understood as public goods – legal certainty, education, 
health, detention, public traffic and others – can be 
transformed into private goods if we want. Such goods are 
then put out of the general public’s competence. In other 
words, they are privatised and their distribution happens 
according to the market trend.
Public goods are traditionally seized by means of two kinds 
of criteria of which at least one must be given: the ‘non-
rivalry’ and the ‘non-exclusiveness’.
Non-rivalry means that the consumption of these goods by 
one person does not disadvantage another one, so that rivalry 
cannot arise: my education contributes to the education of 
others and does not take away anything from their education. 
‘Non-exclusiveness’ means that there is no point in excluding 
anyone from the consumption and thus the usage of goods. If 
we want to exclude certain persons from the good of legal 
certainty, we would literally neutralise this good, because 
legal certainty for a few people would finally mean legal 
uncertainty for all. But does this also apply to the good of 
health?
This largely depends on how we interpret ‘health’ respectively 
to ‘disease’ or ‘illness’. Dependent on these interpretations, 
the criteria of their just distribution will be changed. Up for 
discussion is not whether we distribute the good health, but 
how we do it. About this question, the influential North 
American colleague, Michael Walzer (2002), writes:
So we are distributing lives of a certain sort, and what counts as 
justice in distribution depends on what that ‘sort’ is or, better, on 
the meaning of lives like that for the people whose lives they are. 
We also distribute life itself, mere life, physical life, which is 
given and taken in courts of law judging capital cases, or on the 
battlefield, or in hospitals. Here the criteria are entirely different; 
we make no inquiry into the talent of the professional 
qualifications of the defendant, the enemy soldier, or the patient. 
It is the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the threat posed by 
the enemy, and the illness of the patient that determine our 
response. (p. 24)
When we want to know how to distribute, we must have a 
close look at our interpretations of these goods. Do these 
interpretations possibly have limits? Can we interpret just as 
we like, and by what is our ‘rage of understanding’ (Hörisch 
1998) put in its place? This brings us then to the second thesis.
Our interpretations find their limits with the phenomena, 
which brings us to the second part of our consideration. 
We should not interpret just as we like and be led 
by the phenomena. That means we should not adhere 
our interpretations against the phenomenon which we 
explain, unless we accept its false shape. In that case the 
interpretation would remain in a permanent confrontation 
with the phenomenon of the kind of appearance it claims 
to interpret. Regarding health and disease or illness it can 
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be said, to my opinion, that their individualisation, which 
means the increasing ascription of responsibility for health 
and illness to the individual person and the declaration of the 
patient to a customer, is very much mistaken. Against the 
individualisation of illness or health, the risks of illness can 
only, in a lesser degree, be ascribed individually.
However, we must not take it too lightly. The public good of 
legal certainty results analytically from the meaning of the 
word: whoever privatises legal certainty, wipes it out. The 
legal certainty of a few would result in an immediate legal 
uncertainty of all. All this, however, is not valid in the case of 
health. We can state, without any self-contradiction, that 
human beings may be excluded from the treatment of a 
disease because of the lack of financial return. We can also 
state without contradiction that health performances have a 
competing character. Some say that nothing is to be objected 
against a competition for admission conditions to the 
achievements of the public health system. Now and then the 
sentence is heard that health is, just like the income, a result 
of labour and luck. Their unequal distribution is not more 
unjust than the differences in income, which in liberal 
societies are (indeed) unavoidable.
During the last 30 years there was indeed a tendency traceable 
that points into this direction. The enormous concentration 
on questions of health, which has spread, is a concomitant of 
a new assignment of competence and responsibility. It is the 
individual who is mainly responsible for his or her health. 
Supposing this statement is true, health would, without any 
question, be an existential and private good. This is, however, 
incorrect. The falseness of this opinion can be demonstrated 
on the basis of a rather simple phenomenology of health – a 
phenomenology that can hardly be dismissed.
By phenomenology we understand the following: Even if it is 
difficult to give a precise definition of health, which means to 
say what it is in detail, we know relatively well how health 
comes into existence. A number of factors can be named that 
determine health. The latter is also provided with a structure 
of conditions which we realize as soon as we try to see things 
without blinkers. This is exactly what we mean when we 
speak of phenomenology: It is the attempt to recognise facts 
without such blinkers. As soon as we apply such a way of 
looking at the phenomenon of health, it becomes obvious 
how one-sided or even tinged with ideology our view on 
health is – our opinions of the how of health.
Firstly, people owe their health to the care of others. Long 
before we are able to take care of ourselves, others have 
already done so. In this sense health has literally been 
donated to us. We owe it to a network of protagonists who 
have taken us on the way of a healthy life or have at least 
seriously tried to achieve this aim. And for our whole lifetime 
our health remains embedded in such a network. Without 
others we would be ill or most probably not even alive.
Secondly, our genetic constitution or bio-psychological 
coding, which determines our condition to a high degree, 
even though not exclusively, has not been chosen by 
ourselves. Although the amount or intensity of the 
determining power of the genetic program is quite 
contentious (and probably will be in future), it is difficult to 
deny that people on the basis of their different and far-
reaching non-corrective genetic pre-information will lead a 
particularly different healthy or diseased life.
Thirdly, accidents, misery, misfortune and strokes of fate, 
which altogether endanger our health permanently and even 
can ruin it, belong on the whole to the passive of our lives. 
Whether we are or remain healthy, depends on a bundle of 
incidents which we have to go through. They are not at our 
disposal and we can neither control nor determine them.
Fourthly, we have not chosen our place of birth. We have 
been born into a culture, the practice and convictions of 
which are of severe influence on our health. That life can be 
extremely unjust – this obvious (and true) sentence refers to 
the signature of our cultural origin and background. The 
cultural development of our life forms the quality of our 
physical and spiritual or emotional health in a decisive way. 
To free us from this influence is extremely difficult.
Fifthly, as already mentioned, we have not chosen our place 
of birth. The environment conditions we are exposed to are 
only to a lesser extend subject to the influence of the 
individual. The individual can hardly turn the environment 
conditions into positive ones for himself. The ecological 
structure of the circumstances of our lives, however, has 
enormous power over our state of health. From the 
perspective of our own exercise of influence on these 
circumstances we must state that we are much more engraved 
than engraving.
Sixthly, the social conditions in which we (must) lead our 
lives determine our expectation of life. Here, indeed, the iron 
law exists that the position, which we occupy on the ladder 
of social hierarchy, is decisive for the duration of our lives. 
Here a circular structure of conditions can be assumed. The 
unjust social conditions lead to an inequality in the field of 
health which, in its turn, results in social inequality. Moreover, 
patterns concerning the risks of health are often genetically 
left among the generations. Mobility on the mentioned ladder 
naturally exists, but it underlies ‘on balance’ multifarious 
restrictions. That ladder meanwhile seems permeable rather 
downwards than upwards.
Seventhly, the working conditions under which we spend 
considerable parts of our lives, can be conductive to our 
health. They often modify our health in a negative way. Stress, 
rush and increasing acceleration, exorbitant efficiency 
demands (induced by ourselves or by others), the constraint to 
be successful, flexibility, and permanent willingness of reform 
do cut deep into our health. This distribution of risks turns out 
to be most varying, but the mentioned characteristics of our 
present professional existence seem to spread over all kinds 
of jobs inexorably. The greatest health risk, however, is the 
uneasy working conditions and unemployment. Social stress 
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and gratification risks are, as far as health is concerned, 
enormously precarious.
Eighthly, the level of education, which we have, moulds 
our health extremely strong. Information that strengthen our 
health competence and a way of life that contributes to our 
health, depend on education and thus are distributed very 
differently. Provision, the attention of rules of thumb and the 
avoidance of unnecessary risks – they all lie in our hands – 
presumed that we have the necessary knowledge and are 
motivated to act accordingly.
Ninthly, the quality of the according health system – the 
standards of the medical profession, the attainability and 
the social availability of the achievements adduced there, 
the functioning of bureaucracy, the human circumspection, 
and the restraint of the resources – all this is of decisive 
influence on the possibility of leading a healthy life. 
However, the contribution of the health system to the health 
of the population is often overestimated.
The nine mentioned conditions are obviously interdependent 
and are connected with each other to a considerable extent. 
They point out to the conditioned character of our health. As 
healthy and ill persons we are in a complex system of 
conditions and thus exposed to dependencies. We can (and 
should) of course contribute to leading a healthy life, but this 
asset proves to be rather trifling. Recalling that health is an 
existential good, it becomes instantly clear how negligible 
our access to the quality of this existential good finally is. 
Because it is of existential character, it belongs to the conditional 
goods, which means to the conditions of our existence’s 
possibility. It becomes obvious, however, that the conditional 
good of health is in many ways a conditioned one. 
Particularly, with regard to the important existential good of 
health, we are exceedingly dependent – dependent on others. 
The consequence of this is that the others – and also most 
of us being able to care for others – are responsible. Our 
existence lies vastly in the hands of others.
From all these considerations only one thing follows after all: 
We have our health only for a small part in our own hands. 
Although it is difficult to present a precise numbering of 
the individual contribution – estimates hardly reach beyond 
15% – it becomes clear against the background of the just 
outlined structure of conditions that the popular statement, 
viz. human beings were health agents on their own behalf, 
is nothing but a crude ideology. So, politically only one 
conclusion is possible: Health is a matter of justice. It needs 
compensation and measures of balance to avoid that health 
remains distributed unjustly. This political task can hardly be 
accomplished by the health system, not even by health 
politics (in a narrow sense). Here the social structure of our 
society is put forward for discussion. But the institutions of 
the health system as well as the health political measures 
contribute to easing this problem of justice.
Health is obviously, on the basis of its manifold conditions, a 
public good. Therewith the third question has been also 
answered. The transformation of health into a private good is 
obviously the consequence of a severe misunderstanding, a 
disregard of the conditions under which health and disease 
or illness exist and under which health can be preserved and 
illness be cured, eased or, at least, suffered.
Today we need a broadening of our perspective. It is really a 
topic of severe normative questions – questions of how we 
comprehend health politics and in what way we want, can, 
and should realize the concept of the health system. We must 
not identify all this with the limited perspective of medical 
ethics or the ‘just health care’. It is more than this. It is not 
only a question of ethics of the health system, but it is a 
matter of ‘just health’.
Also, in matters of health and the system of health we should 
‘neither hurt the ideal of equal consideration nor that of 
individual responsibility’ as Ronald Dworkin (2012) 
formulates it. But it does not make sense to privatise risks of 
disease or illness completely. Who does so, hurts the principle 
of equal consideration and finally causes decisive harm to the 
liberty of the individual.
With regard to health and illness, no justice, no approximate 
equality exists without our social and institutional 
interventions. We are in every respect dependent on the 
asymmetric care of others and are, for our part, submitted to 
the obligation of returning in solidarity the care we receive or 
which is promised by others in case of need. People who see 
patients as customers who buy on the market of the health 
system, compete with others, mobilise their purchasing 
power and act as homines oeconomici, forgets the conditional 
character of health as a good. In addition they forget the 
simple fact that ill human beings are suffering human beings. 
These human beings are dependent on an attitude of giving 
and therefore an economy of health is always additionally an 
economy of contribution and donation.
Historically seen the welfare state was the ‘guarantor of the 
production of those goods which are not apt for the market’ 
(Schaal & Ritzi 2012:7). It protects the continued existence 
of public goods against infringements that subdue them 
completely to the competition and the economic demands on 
efficiency. I say with deliberation ‘completely’, because 
nobody can deny in all seriousness that market. Competition 
and efficiency also play an important role in the health 
system. In this sphere the easiest general rule for the time 
being could be: ‘Where no competition is possible, the 
community is responsible.’ Neo-liberalism, however, has set 
the points in a decisively different way. One of its central 
ideas – the idea of an achievement-oriented definition of social 
justice – has pressed the idea of an inclusion-oriented 
understanding of social justice which means to put those 
who are not efficient under the protection of the social 
community. However, a health system, oriented at the ill 
human being, can finally not apply to an efficiency-oriented 
idea of justice. This would, in its core, be contradicted with its 
purpose. For this reason health remains one of the very 
important and essential public goods. It would be good if we, 
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in future put a restriction on the naming of a patient as 
customer. Hereafter we can continue reflecting upon what 
efficiency, profitability and rationalisation can mean in the 
health system.
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